BOOK REVIEWS

Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Mads Kirkebæk eds, China and Denmark—Relations Since 1674, and Christopher Bo Bramsen, Peace and Friendship. Denmark's Official Relations with China. 1674-2000

The collection edited by Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Mads Kirkebaek is based on Danish and Chinese sources (1) and aims at providing on overall survey of Sino-Danish relations since the seventeenth century (2). The date marking the beginning of these relations is 1674, which is when the first Danish expedition set out for India and then China. King Christian IV was inspired by the examples of the English and the Dutch and, driven by the same commercial objectives, he adopted a policy favouring maritime expeditions to Asia.

Over the following centuries, the pursuit of commercial and economic interests continued to shape Denmark’s policy towards China. Links between Denmark and China were established and maintained through the great trading companies: the Danish East India Company up until 1729, followed by the Asiatic Company, which was founded in 1732. The reason for sending the first diplomatic missions to China (3) was to protect these companies’ interests, and to secure them an equal footing with their foreign competitors. The third of these missions led to the signing of a treaty covering friendly relations, trade and maritime passage. It guaranteed favoured nation status to Denmark and extended extraterritorial rights to Danish citizens. So, without having played any part in the wars with China, Denmark achieved the same advantages as the treaty signatories.

At that time, Denmark had a purely commercial attitude to its relations with China, and it had no intention to develop them further into the diplomatic and political fields. For economic reasons, it preferred to refrain from establishing any diplomatic representation in China (although the Chinese imperial government was in favour of such a move). Until 1911, Danish interests were handled by Great Britain at first, and then by Russia, when a Danish secretary was attached to the Russian legation. This unique diplomatic situation came to an end under pressure from the Danish Great Northern Telegraph Company, which preferred the protection of a Danish legation (4), and in 1912 Denmark sent a consul and vice-consul to Shanghai, and nominated some honorary consuls in other Chinese cities.

Denmark tried to take advantage of its small nation status to further its interests. Since it presented no military threat to China, and was without political ambition, it preserved its neutrality amid the conflicts besetting China in the nineteenth century. That is probably why the imperial government gave preference to a Danish company over its British rival to set up telegraphic communications in China. Nonetheless, throughout the Ching dynasty period, Denmark had to rely from time to time on more powerful countries to defend its interests. But the two world wars showed up the weaknesses and the limitations of Danish policy. In 1939, Denmark was confronted with the dilemma of choosing between the nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek and the puppet government set up by the occupying Japanese. At first, it opted for Chungking, but when it was itself occupied, it had to yield to German pressure, and in August 1941 it recognised the government of Wang Jingwei and the Manchukuo entity. Another probable motive pushing Denmark towards this recognition was that Manchurian soya was Denmark’s major import from the region.

Denmark was among the first West European countries to recognise the People’s Republic of China. In fact, one of the main planks of Danish diplomacy was always to recognise any political regime as soon as it “exercised control over its territory (or over a major part of it)” (5). Another determining factor was the need to protect the interests of Danish companies conducting business in China. There is a third angle to the pressures influencing the Danish decision which the writer considers worth mentioning: “Denmark’s attitude was also determined by moral considerations, in the sense that there was a widespread feeling, among the major political parties and the population at large, that the misdeeds of Western colonialism needed to be set right in order to help developing countries build a better future for themselves” (6). Moreover, it was a question of supporting an oppressed people fighting for self-determination, a fight which Denmark was traditionally inclined to support. The recognition of the PRC from the moment of its foundation, and the fact that Denmark did not maintain a consulate in Taiwan, had a positive influence on Sino-Danish relations. Subsequently, the Chinese government found other advantages in the Danish connection: as a member of NATO, it occupied a particularly important strategic position at the intersection of the Baltic, the North Sea, and the Atlantic. In addition, it offered a double opening onto the European Economic Community and its Scandinavian neighbours. The high point of relations between the two countries was in October 1974, when prime minister Paul Hartling was received by Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong. After that, Denmark’s importance for the PRC’s foreign policy waned. By the end of the 1980s, following the mending of Sino-Soviet relations, it was no longer of any great strategic significance for the Chinese. Furthermore, the very critical stance taken by the Danish government over the Tiananmen crisis in 1989, which was sustained for a long time, in addition to its criticism of China’s violation of human rights (in particular the Danish resolution in April 1997 against the PRC at the UN Committee on Human Rights), considerably damaged Sino-Danish relations and led to serious consequences for economic and trade relations. As a result, since 1998 Denmark has adopted the same position as the rest of the European Union.

Testifying to the overwhelming weight that Denmark attaches to its economic relations with China, six out of the book’s ten chapters deal with the development of trade relations between the two countries. Of these, four relate to the period from the seventeenth century to 1949, one to relations with the PRC, and one to relations with Taiwan. Both before and after 1949, the trade balance was nearly always in China’s favour. Denmark’s main imports were soya, cinnamon, sesame seeds and tea, while it exported machinery and dairy products. Before 1949 a few large Danish companies were able to profit from economic relations with China, including the Great Northern Telegraph Company, the maritime East Asiatic Company, and the Danish Soya Cake company (7). But in general, Danish firms were not powerful enough to develop a strategy for such a distant country, and one so wracked by political turmoil as China was. Since 1949, Sino-Danish commercial links have undergone the same rate and kind of development as those of other West European countries: the PRC exports manufactured goods, textiles and electrical products, while Denmark exports machinery and vehicles, as well as chemicals. The PRC is Denmark’s third largest non-European source of imports (8). Danish firms started to invest in China relatively late, but they have quickly set up representative offices (166 in 1998). The largest foreign-owned shipping company operating in China is the Danish company, Maersk Shipping. For its part, the Danish government provides export credits and supports aid projects beneficial to China. There is particularly strong scientific and technical co-operation in such fields as anti-pollution measures, environmental protection, agricultural productivity and veterinary medicine. Since the 1990s, economic ties between the two countries have been strengthening.

Denmark’s relations with Taiwan have always been purely economic, and the volume of trade between the two countries has remained lower than between Denmark and the PRC (in the 1990s trade volume with the PRC was double that with Taiwan (9)). The main components of this trade are somewhat surprising, for Denmark’s primary exports to Taiwan are foodstuffs and machinery, while Taiwan also sells machinery to Denmark, along with manufactured goods. Denmark’s trade balance has only shifted into deficit since the 1970s. One hundred and forty Danish companies trade with Taiwan, but only about ten have offices there. The first Danish trade office in Taiwan was set up in 1983, whereas Taiwan had had an office in Copenhagen since 1973 and this has established links with all the Nordic countries. Here too there has been increasing activity, and 1993 saw the first visit to the island republic by a member of the Danish government. Following general European policy, Denmark is beginning to pay closer attention to Taiwan’s economic importance.

This book is rich in source materials, documents and commentaries, all of which throw light on the series of problems that have confronted, and continue to confront, a small country like Denmark in its relations with China. Not having sufficient economic or political clout to make its views or decisions accepted, it has to rely on the support of the major players on the international scene, and it has to defend its interests by following in their wake. All the skill and originality in its policy-making consists in taking advantage of a number of opportunities—its small size which gives it preference over more threatening and less pliable partners, its strategic geographical location, etc.—and it also means giving particular emphasis to its specific capabilities in the fields of economics and technology. Since its international influence is rather small, its defence of its own economic interests is all the more reliant on a pragmatic foreign policy.

The second book under review is a bilingual publication in English and Chinese. Its author, Christopher Bo Bramsen, was the Danish consul general in Shanghai in 1994, and ambassador to Peking in 1995. The Chinese translation is by Lin Hua, who held a diplomatic post in Denmark for fourteen years. He is also the author of a book on Nordic myths and sagas, and has translated the works of Andersen. Its 150 pages comprise a clear and concise summary of the principal phases in recent Sino-Danish relations. It contains abundant information on the diplomacy between the two states (agreements, embassy personnel, etc.) which are useful for historians, specialists in international relations, and sinologists (particularly in the transcription of Chinese names). It is, however, a largely descriptive work intended for current use, aimed at stressing “the development of friendly relations” between Denmark and China.

Both books have the merit of providing, in a language accessible to most researchers, an exhaustive account of the hitherto largely unknown subject of Sino-Danish relations. They are the response to a felt need to have Danish research on China made available to a wider European and international readership, and they are part of the effort by Scandinavian countries to develop their competence in sinology and to achieve recognition. It should be added that both books are very well illustrated with photographs and archival records with commentaries, which recreate the historical context and considerably enhance the reader’s enjoyment.

Translated from the French original by Jonathan Hall